This study examines ten programmes to advance energy efficiency and retrofitting of existing, private sector buildings in C40 cities in Asia-Pacific and USA. We set out to identify differing policy approaches, together with potential impacts and implementation challenges for each. Findings unearthed six policy models-both mandatory and voluntary-with unique impacts and challenges. We demonstrate that innovation occurs without new policy inventions and largely by necessity, as new features are added and generic models are adapted to local circumstances. Our sample demonstrated experimentation with benchmarking in the USA, comprehensive regulation in Asia, and voluntary approaches in Australia. Overall, environmental impacts are particularly slow to emerge and plagued with attribution challenges. We found limited evidence of benchmarking programme effectiveness in reducing energy consumption in the shortterm, but some indication of mid-term outcomes. Driven by unique local circumstances, the cap-and-trade model stood out by fostering rapid, sustained and attributable GHG emission reductions and retrofitting. Market and social impacts are highly significant across all programmes, highlighting needs to consider non-environmental impacts in policy evaluation. We emphasise the complementary potential of voluntary and regulatory approaches to advancing energy efficiency and climate resilience. We also underscore the potential for reporting or benchmarking programmes to later transition to models mandating performance improvements, such as cap-and-trade.
Introduction
Given the global imperative to reduce GHG emissions and fossil fuel consumption, expectations are mounting for city governments to innovate and develop effective policies for urban climate, energy and resilience challenges (Bulkeley, 2015; World Bank, 2010 ). Wielding direct control over local laws and much built environment infrastructure, cities can function as 'laboratories' or experiment zones for showcasing emerging forms of governance (Castan Broto and Bulkeley, 2013; Bulkeley et al., 2014a) . With much progress worldwide in renewable energy policies such as feed-in tariffs and subsidies (Brown, 2015) , policymaker attention is increasingly shifting towards reducing fossil fuel consumption and GHG emissions in buildings.
In 2010, the global building stock represented 34% of final energy use and 24% of energy-related GHG emissions (IPCC, 2014) . In mega cities such as New York, Hong Kong, San Francisco and Tokyo, these figures are closer to double, with building GHG emissions and energy consumption dwarfing other sectors such as transport. Building stocks require decades to replace. They thus contribute to 'carbon lock-in', heavily influencing future efforts to decrease GHG emissions and boost climate resilience (IPCC, 2014) . Although industrialised nation cities have advanced measures to improve energy efficiency in new construction (Van Der Heijden, 2014) , decarbonisation of existing buildings remains an unsolved challenge (Dowling et al., 2014) , demanding unprecedented levels of policymaking innovation.
Novelty and pioneering behaviour is integral to innovation. Yet what is deemed 'new' is purely contextual, since very few policies are novel in a global sense (Howlett, 2014) .
Instead, bureaucrat 'policy entrepreneurs' innovate by learning and appropriating policy models from frontrunner peers (Bulkeley, 2010; Matisoff and Edwards, 2014) . Global networks such as C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (henceforth C40) or ICLEI Climate Cities Program (Acuto, 2016) can spur this by enabling collective learning amongst policymakers from exemplary or pioneering practices. In addition, policymaker learning and innovation is fuelled by 'intermediaries' (Guy et al. 2010) . These include NGOs, private sector actors and government agencies that mediate across societal sectors to foster novel practices and socio-technical change in urban infrastructure.
Global networks therefore constitute rich opportunities for examining innovation in urban climate change governance.
Three potential angles of inquiry are highlighted by Huitema (2014a, 2014c) for studying climate policy innovation: (1) invention-formulation of novel policies or elements; (2) diffusion-adoption of innovative policies; and (3) evaluation-assessment of impacts. Although related scholarship has burgeoned in recent years, significant gaps remain. These concern particularly how similar policies are modified to suit local circumstances (Biesenbender and Tosun, 2014) or evaluated (Auld et al., 2014; Jordan and Huitema, 2015; Hilden et al., 2014) . Regarding evaluation, as increasing numbers of cities experiment with emerging or unproven policies for climate and energy challenges (Auld et al., 2014; Castan Broto and Bulkeley 2013) , needs for knowledge on actual or potential effects are growing. Policies to advance energy efficiency, retrofitting and GHG emission reductions in buildings are laden with high expectations since they are core components of wider and often politically ambitious city climate targets. Yet lack of monitoring and uncertainty of results can deter innovation and risk-taking (Huag et al., 2010) . Knowledge on differing potential impacts is therefore vital for cities weighing up multiple policy options (Van Der Heijden, 2015) .
Responding to these cues, we gathered evidence from ten C40 cities in Asia-Pacific (Hong Kong, Melbourne, Sydney, Singapore and Tokyo) and the USA (Houston, New York, Seattle, San Francisco and Philadelphia). Heeding calls for cross-national and comparative studies in climate governance (Castan Broto and Bulkeley, 2013) , we focus specifically on ten individual city programmes to advance energy efficiency and retrofitting in existing, private sector buildings. Data is sourced from city officials via questionnaires, interviews, documents and literature. Assuming that policy inventions are rare (Howlett, 2014) and that few cities design policies from scratch (Jordan and Huitema, 2014c), we examine diffusion and evaluation aspects as follows. 
Methods
This study examines experiences of policymakers and implementers in ten cities actively participating in the C40 working group Private Building Efficiency Network (PBEN) 1 . It builds on data gathered during January-December 2014 for research commissioned by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) and C40 London (Takagi et al. 2014 
Innovation through diffusion

Key policy models
Scholars point out stark differences between mandatory (compliance mandated by law and regulations) and voluntary approaches to governing urban climate and resiliency challenges (Huag et al., 2010; Van Der Heijden, 2014) . This distinction informs our categorisation of six policy models in Table 2 (also indicated for each city in Table 1 ).
Although examined in isolation below, we observed that cities readily combine several mandatory models into single programmes. 
Benchmarking
Mandates submission of energy/water consumption and GHG emissions data for individual buildings. Allows annual monitoring of individual building performance as well as comparisons with similar building types. May involve public disclosure of individual building data.
Periodical energy efficiency auditing or retro-commissioning
Mandates conducting of energy efficiency auditing or retro-commissioning at specified time intervals, usually several years apart.
Energy efficiency standards
Mandates satisfying of minimum energy efficiency standards when replacing or renovating specified building components.
Cap-and-trade
Mandates achievement of minimum GHG emission reduction targets for individual buildings or facilities (comprised of several buildings) via internal actions or trading of emissions credits.
Voluntary
Capacity building
Fosters voluntary reduction of energy/water consumption in individual buildings by offering incentives such as access to knowledge on best practices, technical support, finance and public recognition of programme participation.
Friendly competition
Aims to foster significant reductions of energy/water consumption and introduction of green office practices over a short time period (e.g. 12-months) in a cohort of buildings and tenants competing to outperform each other. Incentives include prospects of 'winning' and gaining mayoral and media recognition, in addition to those in capacity building above.
Mandatory models dominated. They accounted for seven of the ten programmes, being mostly salient in Asia and the USA. Interestingly, this contrasts with tendencies in the wider C40 network, where non-regulatory approaches dominate climate governance (Schultz et al., 2015) . The prevalence of mandatory models in our sample could be partly explained by growing realisations around the limited effectiveness of nonregulatory approaches in engaging large market segments around climate and energy issues (Huag et al., 2010; Van Der Heijden 2015) , particularly in the building sector. We found three cities (Houston, Melbourne and Sydney) experimenting with voluntary approaches. In particular, voluntary models (and specifically capacity building) appear the preferred strategy in Australia. With prototypes of all six models previously existing in other cities, in line with our initial assumptions, we found no evidence of new policy inventions. Instead, as elaborated in Section 3.2, policy innovation occurs through diffusion (i.e. adoption and adaption).
Benchmarking
Mandatory building energy benchmarking schemes (henceforth 'benchmarking') dominated approaches in the USA (New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco and Seattle).
One was observed in Singapore; the only in Asia-Pacific. Prevalence in the USA appears driven by expectations that "what gets measured gets improved" and recent advances in data management capability (Hsu, 2014 (Palmer and Walls, 2015) .
Periodical energy auditing or retrocommissioning
This approach was observed twice in Asia and the USA and is commonly combined with other models like benchmarking in New York, San Francisco and Singapore.
Auditing delivers an appraisal of energy performance in various building components and includes a list of capital-intensive retrofitting measures with cost and projected payback periods (Annunziata et a., 2014 Continued high performance is assured by mandating energy audits every three years.
In New York, requirements are significantly more comprehensive. In addition to installing sub-metres in tenanted spaces, Local Law 88 requires building owners to upgrade all lighting fixtures once before 2025 in accordance with a local energy code stretched stricter than the state counterpart. In addition, Local Law 85 sets specific energy efficiency standards for building envelopes and mechanical, lighting and power system performance during retrofitting and also new construction.
Cap-and-Trade
As the environmental outcomes of all mandatory measures examined depend largely on building usage, Tokyo's cap-and-trade programme is highly unique since it's cap assures a predictable minimum quantity of GHG emission reductions across a building stock. Tokyo's program mandates CO 2 e emission reductions in approximately 1,000 commercial (mostly offices) and 250 industrial (factories and water/sewage treatment plants etc.) facilities 3 consuming annually in excess of 1500kL crude oil equivalent.
Affected facilities represent approximately 40% of citywide CO2 emissions in each sector. Until recent adoption in China (Zhang et al., 2014) , for several years this was globally the only cap-and-trade targeting a single city (Rudolph and Kawakatsu, 2013) .
Mandated CO 2 e emissions reduction quantities are termed 'compliance factors'. In the first commitment period FY2010-FY2014 these are 6% for industrial and 8% for commercial, then 15% and 17% respectively for the second period FY2015-FY2019.
Baselines are flexible, measured over any three-year average over FY2002-FY2007. As with all cap-and-trades, targeted facilities may meet reduction targets through internal measures or by procuring credits.
Capacity building
This voluntary model was confined to Sydney and Melbourne. Capacity building programmes seek to foster retrofitting and energy efficiency improvements through principally two incentive types: 'educative' and 'enabling' (Dowling et al., 2014) . The former involves provision of knowledge, best practices and advice on retrofitting and reducing energy and water consumption through consultations and training with partnering organisations or city officials, member networking events and electronic bulletins etc. (Annunziata et al., 2014) . Enabling incentives seek to enhance capacity to measure energy and water consumption and implement improvement measures through subsidised audits, rebates and financing support.
In pursuit of citywide climate neutrality by 2020, Melbourne's 1200 Buildings Program has pursued since 2010 the lofty objective of raising energy efficiency in 1200 buildings containing office space (around two-thirds of citywide commercial buildings) by 38% by 2020. To support this goal, a signatory programme was established where buildings (currently 57) sign a commitment letter to the City Mayor, pledging to reduce energy use by at least 38%, measure and report energy and water consumption, and build and implement a retrofit plan. In addition to above-described enabling and educational incentives, further measures to coax industry to join the signatory 'club' include use of an official programme logo and participation plaque to improve public image and demonstrate leadership to shareholders, and events to recognise outstanding performance. Sydney's completed Smart Green Apartments programme is comparatively modest in scale and ambition. Participation was limited to 30 residential apartment buildings receiving both educative and enabling forms of capacity building to spur energy and water saving through retrofitting.
Friendly competition
This model was limited to Houston's Green Office Challenge. Participants compete over a 12-month period to rapidly decrease energy and water consumption and raise office sustainability in a 'friendly', non-regulatory ambience. Above-described educative and enabling type incentives are used to encourage buildings to participate, improve performance and disclose energy and water consumption data to fellow competitors.
Further incentives come from prospects of 'winning' and receiving recognition through mayoral award ceremonies and media coverage. Houston's programme demonstrates uniqueness on two levels. First, by moving beyond energy and water consumption data to holistically measure green office practices via indicators for waste and recycling, purchasing and transport modes; and secondly, by fixing a participation category uniquely for tenants, in addition to a building owner/manager category.
Innovation through adaptation to local circumstances
We unearthed diverse evidence that policy innovation occurs through diffusion and in the 'finer details' of policies as generic models are combined into single programmes or modified to suit local contexts. We also observed that unique local institutional, stakeholder and built environment circumstances influence the design, level of innovation and fate of programmes in various ways.
Tokyo officials heavily modified the generic cap-and-trade approach to local conditions and stakeholder demands, sparking much innovation in the process. The world-first decision to target downstream buildings was driven by a lack of industrial facilities combusting on-site and, conversely, the abundance of energy-intensive office and commercial buildings and industrial facilities. Stakeholder demands also spurred further tailoring. With building lobbies opposing a short-term trading-based framework due to the uncertainty and potential fluctuation of carbon pricing, officials opted for five-year commitment periods to spur long-term decision making and investments in retrofitting (Nishida and Hua, 2016) . Opposition from already highly energy efficient buildings with significant past investments (Nishida and Hua, 2011) drove further innovation. In addition to flexible three-year baseline periods, a specially designed building certification scheme allows facilities to reduce compliance factors by 50% for 'top-level' certification and 25% for 'near top-level' if meeting energy efficiency and sustainability criteria set by TMG (2015) . With industry also expressing concern over difficulties engaging tenants in energy reduction, two cap-and-trade legal stipulations were added.
Tenants occupying larger than 5,000 m 2 or consuming more than 6GWh annually in electricity must 1) submit an individual report of annual emissions and energy saving measures to TMG via the owner and 2) comply with owner or management strategies to reduce energy consumption.
Benchmarking programmes were also significantly tailored to institutional and Compared to disclosure of raw data results as spreadsheets, these tools facilitate easy performance comparison across building types and location. Public disclosure in these cities was enabled by the competitive nature of the local building industry, who saw public disclosure as a potential driver for boosting the market competitiveness of assets.
In contrast, industry resistance prevented public disclosure in Seattle and San
Francisco. In other cities, local circumstances restricted initial benchmarking objectives and trailblazing in other ways. For example, institutional restrictions necessitated an abandonment of plans to target the residential sector in San Francisco, as officials lack state authority to directly regulate residential energy usage data. Interestingly, such restrictive conditions were not present in other cities such as Seattle and New York, which both target commercial and multi-family buildings. For minimum GFA thresholds, adjustment and raising was necessitated in Seattle and San Francisco. Both cities had initial ambitions of targeting buildings half the size of present GFA thresholds (see Table 2 )-i.e. half of 1,858 m 2 (20,000 ft 2 ) and 929 m 2 (10,000 ft 2 ) respectively. Yet these were abandoned once it was realised that this would require resource-constrained officials to manage an additional 9,000 and 11,000 smaller buildings respectively.
Local contexts affected voluntary programmes too, triggering pioneering approaches.
In Houston, they even influenced the choice of policy models. Building industry consultations revealed a preference for bottom-up solutions over top-down policy mandates, triggering the adoption of a voluntary 'friendly competition' model. 
Evaluation: Impacts, challenges and countermeasures
Here we draw on emerging evidence in the surveyed programmes to examine observed and potential impacts (categorised as environmental, market and social), challenges and countermeasures for the six policy models identified. Findings are summarised into We found self-reported data accuracy from benchmarking a constant preoccupation for officials, and a major factor behind attribution difficulties. As common culprits, cities underscored incorrect manual entries for energy/water consumption, GHG emissions and GFA, difficulties in identifying these, and technical flaws in reporting methodologies from benchmarking service providers. In the absence of penalties for incorrect data entries, benchmarking programmes require development of error identification and data cleaning tools. Another important strategy is utility co-operation to enable automated data uploading and transfer to cities (achieved in Seattle, San Francisco and Singapore).
This eliminates manual entry of energy (electricity, gas and steam) and water consumption amounts. Other observed challenges include difficulties for owners in obtaining data from tenants for building-level aggregated data purposes, which can affect ability to comply with submission deadlines. Commonly cited reasons include direct contracts between tenants and energy suppliers or tenant unwillingness to provide necessary data, especially in cases of high energy consumption. A further challenge for officials concerns eventual needs to move beyond enforcement of data submission towards measures to improve market appreciation and public value of energy efficiency performance data. Although public disclosure of individual building data can facilitate this, benchmarking ultimately requires incentives and polices to raise the energy performance of laggard buildings and foster retrofitting. A final limitation concerns the value of annual EUI for understanding building energy consumption.
Officials emphasised the eventual need for monthly or seasonal data from Portfolio
Manager to better ascertain energy intense periods.
Periodical energy efficiency auditing or retrocommissioning
The tune-up nature of retrocommissioning (and chiller auditing in Singapore) guarantees some degree of energy efficiency improvement. However, since auditing does not generally involve tune-up work, environmental impacts are highly unpredictable. As potential challenges, the most significant concern limitations in bringing building owners to act upon results. Reliance on government subsidies and finance schemes to incite action demands large financial resources and passes retrofitting costs to tax payers (Nishida and Hua, 2011) . A second challenge involves needs to assure that auditors and engineers adhere to a common code of practice and engineering 
Energy efficiency standards
The major, anticipatable environmental impact from this model is assurance that replaced or newly added building systems confirm to specific energy efficiency criteria. A key limitation of energy efficiency standards for retrofitting is that they take effect only at the time of a retrofit. Retrofitting timing is influenced by equipment and building lifetimes (City of Melbourne, 2015) and long-term upgrade investment strategies, which unfold over decades. Raising operational performance of core building installations across an entire building stock through energy efficiency standards can thus require decades. Secondly, since they define minimally socially acceptable norms, there is little incentive for building owners to invest in higher energy performance (Nishida and Hua, 2011) . A third challenge concerns tracking of code conformance during a retrofit, as enforcement falls on the shoulders of private sector certifiers and engineers. As with auditing and retrocomissioning, inconsistent certification can nullify environmental and economic benefits. Strategies are thus required to ensure that certifiers abide to uniform guidelines. As an exemplary countermeasure, Hong Kong has limited certification and auditing of targeted building equipment to government trained and registered energy assessors.
Cap-and-trade
Tokyo has data demonstrating potential effectiveness of cap-and-trade approaches.
With the first compliance period FY2010-FY2014 now ended, a 25% reduction has been achieved from baseline CO 2 emissions of 13,627,000 t-CO 2 (TMG, 2016).
Reductions were significant each year; a 13% reduction was achieved in the first, 22%
in the second and third, and 23% in the fourth. Cumulative reductions for FY2010-FY2014 measure 14,281,000 t-CO 2 e. High predictability and control over GHG emission reductions is innate to the cap-and-trade model (Serre et al., 2015) . However, these rapidly achieved results were unanticipated. They far exceed emissions cap reductions for the first (8%) and second compliance period (17%), which finishes in 2020.
Interestingly, these results depend on using a fixed carbon intensity factor of 0.382 kg- transactions and a mere 107,169 t-CO 2 e relative to baseline emissions of 13,627,000 t-
The bulk of GHG emission and energy savings were therefore achieved through retrofitting and onsite measures. Annual reports submitted by affected facilities (Nishida and Hua, 2016) generate valuable qualitative and quantitative data on energy saving measures. These include capital-intensive upgrades such as high efficiency heat source equipment (contributing a 133,000 t-CO 2 e reduction over the first commitment period), high-efficiency pumps for air-conditioning (28,000 t-CO 2 e), high-efficiency air 5 Most domestic trading involves renewable energy credits or direct transfers of excess emission credits between entities.
conditioning such as turbo chillers (27,900 t-CO 2 e), high-efficiency lighting equipment and controls (71,700 t-CO 2 e) and LED lighting (49,400 t-CO 2 e).
The success demonstrated by cap-and-trade in Tokyo in rapidly and drastically reducing final energy consumption and CO 2 emissions is highly contextual. As mentioned, it was largely achieved by proactive investments in retrofitting by affected facilities. This resulted from both policy design and industry mentality. On the former, the programme is characterised by five-year compliance periods, which encourage long-term and strategic industry investing in retrofitting. Also, carbon trading was designed only as a back-up option for facilities unable to meet emission reduction obligations internally. As mentioned, emissions allowance trading is restricted to excess permits after annual reductions obligations are met. This results in a low circulation volume and high prices. On the latter, industry mentality led to the non-reliance on short-term trading. As expressed during consultations with city officials (Nishida and Hua, 2011) , industry stakeholders desired to meet emission reduction obligations primarily through internal measures and strategic long-term investment in equipment upgrade.
As additional market impacts, job creation also occurred. ESCOs numbers have expanded from increased demand for energy consulting, and similarly, verification agencies owing to requirements that all submitted data be checked by TMG registered Superseded by the cap-and-trade, this was a mandatory GHG emissions reporting and public disclosure initiative for large emitters. Similar to benchmarking schemes, this did not mandate actual reductions. Although the initiative's impact on reducing GHG emissions was not as high as officials hoped, it fostered valuable relations and trust with industry. In addition, it secured detailed self-reported data on emissions trends, installed building systems, and energy consumption reduction potential. During the transition to the cap-and-trade, this helped counter industry arguments that further CO 2 reductions were impossible, and also, selection of an ambitious and equitable cap (Nishida and Hua, 2011) . Additionally, the aforementioned top-or near-top level certification scheme, which rewards past efforts for highly performing facilitates, also proved an invaluable countermeasure to industry resistance.
Capacity building
City official expectations suggest that potential environmental impacts of voluntary capacity building programmes include the fostering of long-term building management strategies, leading to reductions in energy and water consumption and GHG emissions.
Actual evidence of such outcomes however lacks in the sample. Without mandatory energy and water consumption reporting in citywide office buildings, Melbourne officials are unable to gauge programme effects on the larger building population. In the signatory component, officials are also unable to determine progress towards the -38% energy consumption target for 57 participating buildings. Voluntary agreements have proved incapable of bringing building owners to periodically report energy and water consumption and monitor outcomes of retrofitting. Sydney officials did not monitor the energy and water consumption outcomes of their programme.
Capacity building approaches demonstrated some potential to foster retrofitting.
Sydney reported a 37% uptake of sustainability improvements and retrofitting in retrofitting, and lack asset master plans and long-term strategies for upgrading equipment. Reliance on financial capacity raising, should also anticipate challenges.
Despite attractiveness as a low-risk finance option for owners, the Environmental
Upgrade Agreement has to date seen only seven partakers across the city, disappointing lofty political expectations. Contrary to expectations that access to finance was the major barrier to retrofitting, officials learned that most buildings prefer to self-fund upgrades (City of Melbourne, 2015) . Potential explanations are wariness of long-term involvement with government, burdensome application procedures, and high minimum loan thresholds (originally AU$500,000).
Friendly competition
Although confined to Houston's Green Office Challenge, several observations can be made on this model. In terms of potential market impacts, officials expressed confidence that the programme has contributed to a citywide rise in LEED existing building certifications.
Although uncertainty surrounds the programme's precise contribution, demonstrating that smaller and existing buildings can obtain LEED or Energy Star status, and then diffusing these experiences amongst participants, is a key outcome. Social impacts were significant. For example, the programme demonstrated a unique ability to involve tenants and thereby foster cooperation with owners regarding energy and sustainability issues. This was facilitated by the aforementioned creation of separate tenant and owner/manager categories and scoring systems. Also important, this model nourished co-operative relationships around energy usage between city officials and frontrunner buildings-with significant industry influence and capacity to trigger widespread change-in a friendly, non-mandatory ambience. This allowed officials to collect empirical data on baseline emissions, reduction potential and outcomes of certain actions in key city office buildings. As shown in Tokyo, these relationships and datasets can potentially prove important for informing later transitions to mandatory frameworks.
Houston experiences suggest potential challenges for this competition model. Firstly, securing sustained participation of individual buildings and tenants over consecutive competition years has proved difficult. Second, whilst consulting with stakeholders during the design phase, officials encountered concerns that focusing on baseline energy performance would alienate both laggard buildings unable to make necessary investments in retrofitting, and frontrunners already attaining a high level of energy efficiency. To overcome this, the emergent programme encouraged participation of frontrunners by rewarding mentor 'badges' and highlighting their advanced performance as desirable benchmarks for laggards. Officials also experienced challenges spurring uptake of a specially designed funding mechanism to cover 20% of material and labour costs for energy upgrades. Attractiveness was low due to shortterm funding availability reflecting the 12-month competition period. This triggered realisations that longer funding availability is required for coaxing retrofitting in friendly competitions, especially for public institutions with long-planning horizons. Supporting other studies (Jordan and Huitema, 2014b) , we demonstrated that invention of new policies is not a precondition to innovation in policy design and implementation.
Supporting Bulkeley et al. (2014a) , we found that policy innovation partly arises from necessity-as unique and local institutional, stakeholder and built environment circumstances prevent cities transposing 'pre-fabricated' policies from peers.
Innovation occurs through tailoring and adding new features to generic policy models, and by combining multiple models into single programmes. We also showed that local conditions may necessitate compromising initial ambitions, hampering the ability to innovate, and therefore, subsequent policy impacts. From the perspective of sustainability transitions literature, this evidence suggests that 'landscape' cultural factors (Geels, 2002) outside policymaker control will largely impact the design and outcomes of programmes. These include building industry attitudes to energy consumption management, retrofitting and climate change, and willingness to be governed.
From an evaluation viewpoint, we identified varied environmental, economic and social impacts. We thus emphasise the need to look beyond environmental indicators when evaluating climate, energy and resilience policies. Overall, environmental outcomes are particularly slow to emerge, plagued by attribution challenges, and require further monitoring. One exception was the friendly competition model, which demonstrated an ability to bring about rapid and attributable reductions in energy consumption over a short-term period. Suitability for driving long-term improvements over several years however seems limited. Driven by unique local circumstances and design features, the cap-and-trade model was another exception, generating rapid, sustained and outcomes. It vastly exceeded initial GHG reduction objectives and stimulated much retrofitting in Tokyo. Success factors include industry willingness to invest in retrofitting measures without reliance on short-term carbon trading, measures to ensure high carbon prices, and five-year compliance periods to foster long-term investment.
Attribution of impacts was possible due to annual survey data taken from affected facilities. Recent introductions of cap-and-trade in China and Korea (Serre et al., 2015) suggest these results are noted globally, and that this model is undergoing diffusion across Asia.
Regarding benchmarking, overall evidence of short-term effectiveness in advancing energy efficiency and retrofitting is mixed, and plagued with attribution challenges. The most promising results appeared after four to five years in New York and San Francisco.
Major implementation challenges include data accuracy issues from self-reporting and difficulties for building owners in securing aggregate property data. For officials, there is an eventual need to move beyond initial enforcement of data reporting towards measures to bring laggard buildings in line with desirable benchmarks. Increasing the public visibility and market value of results is essential. In the short-term, the principal value of benchmarking for policymakers lies in the data itself. Results allow policymakers to create a baseline and better understand the energy efficiency of a building stock, and potentially, formulate additional mandatory or voluntary measures to incite buildings to act upon annual results. Although we did not examine impacts on water consumption, we highlight this as an underappreciated area meriting future enquiry by other scholars.
Anecdotal evidence of market impacts such as increased green jobs existed in many cities, yet mostly, quantitative monitoring lacks. Conversely, much evidence was found for significant social impacts across all models. A common outcome was the ability of programmes to raise industry awareness of energy efficiency performance in buildings, and also, increase building owner capacity to measure performance and implement energy management strategies and improvements. Although voluntary approaches grapple with incentive difficulties in the absence of regulations, we draw attention to their unique and potential ability to foster policymaker and industry trust in an amiable, non-regulatory ambience. We emphasised their ability to generate datasets for informing future mandatory programmes (as demonstrated in Tokyo's cap-and-trade), and potentially, complementing mandatory models through friendly competitions and rewarding good performance. Scholars and policymakers therefore need not view voluntary and mandatory approaches as polarities or competing options when advancing urban climate resilience and progress to city GHG emission targets. The transition in Tokyo from a carbon emissions reporting scheme (not mandating actual reductions) to a cap-and-trade (mandating reductions over five-year periods) also indicates a potential future pathway for benchmarking schemes.
Given their global weight environmentally, economically and politically, it is imperative that C40 cities succeed in decreasing energy consumption and GHG. However, with some exceptions, the effectiveness of surveyed programmes to advance energy efficiency in existing, private buildings is still uncertain. Further monitoring and research is required on mid-and long-term impacts; not just environmental, but also market and social.
